WWW
Contractor Laptop
Contractor Laptop
Stolen Credentials
Stolen Credentials
Snowflake User
Snowflake User
Snowflake Warehouse
Snowflake Warehouse
Attacker Storage
Attacker Storage
Operator arrest
Operator arrest
SCN-004 / Infostealer + No MFA + Stale Credentials / 2024

Snowflake 2024

Credentials harvested by infostealer malware on contractor laptops - some dating to 2020 - were replayed against Snowflake accounts without MFA. 165 customer instances impacted; AT&T, Ticketmaster, Santander, LendingTree among named victims.
165
orgs impacted
79.7%
creds previously exposed
0
MFA enforcement
4+ yrs
oldest creds (2020)
UNC5537 · Moucka arrested 2024
Attackers did not break in - they logged in with credentials stolen from developer laptops as far back as 2020, because MFA was not required at the tenant level.
$28M+
Exposure
$28M of AT&T's $177M settlement (preliminary June 2025); Ticketmaster MDL still active
4 years
Time to detect
earliest infostealer infection Nov 2020; Mandiant alerted Snowflake May 22 2024
Enforce MFA
Fix complexity
tenant-level MFA + network allow-lists per Mandiant top recommendations
Ask your team this Friday
Which of our SaaS data warehouses (Snowflake, Databricks, BigQuery) allow username+password authentication without enforced MFA at tenant policy level?
Audit my environment
TEXT
STEP 01 UNC5537 sources credentials from infostealer logs
Logs harvested across multiple stealer families (Mandiant attribution)
1# Mandiant-named infostealer families used as the input source for UNC5537:
2  - VIDAR
3  - RISEPRO
4  - REDLINE
5  - RACOON STEALER
6  - LUMMA
7  - METASTEALER
8
9# Distribution: Russian-language criminal markets + Telegram channels.
10# Credential age: some logs dated to 2020 - 4+ years stale at time of use.
Out-of-band initial access · the credentials were not stolen from Snowflake - they were stolen from contractors, developers and personal devices whose browsers had saved them.
1 / 7
← back
demo state
Export

Generate audit report

Self-contained snapshot of this scenario - step-by-step chain, fixes, ATT&CK mappings, threat actor context.
Click to highlight toxic edges
What if…
node label
Remove this node
Strip outgoing permissions
Reset to original R
REMOVING NODE - saves 0 nodes Esc · R
Right-click any node to test a fix
BREAK POINT
Cut this edge → -- nodes unreachable
Fix: --